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Ellsberg    designed a decision experiment where most people violated
the axioms of rational choice He asked people to bet on the outcome of
certain random events with known and with unknown probabilities They
usually preferred to bet on events with known probabilities It is shown that
this behavior is reasonable and in accordance with the axioms of rational
decision making if it is assumed that people consider bets on events that are
repeatedly sampled instead of just sampled once
Key words Ellsbergs paradox	 rational decision making	 Sure Thing Princi
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 Introduction
Ellsberg    designed an experiment	 where people had to decide between
bets on risky lotteries with known probabilities or on uncertain events	 where
probabilities were not known They usually preferred to bet on the lottery
thereby blatantly violating the rationality axioms of Bayesian decision theory	
sometimes also referred to as Subjective Expected Utility SEU theory This
behavior has therefore been called a paradox The Ellsberg Paradox has
since become the paradigm for a new concept in decision theory ambiguity
Probability statements can be more or less ambiguous depending on how
strong an individual believes in the assertion of these probabilities
Otherwise rational people seem to express a preference for unambiguous
probabilities	 ie	 for probabilities that are objective and completely known
to them They shrink from ambiguous probabilities	 ie	 probabilities that
are only of a subjective kind or that are objective but only vaguely known A
typical example would be an urn I with red and black balls of an unknown
proportion	 out of which one ball is to be drawn If indeed nothing is known
about the proportion of red and black balls in the urn	 then one might be
indierent of whether to bet on Red or on Black	 just as with an urn II	
where the red and the black balls are in equal number and where this propor

tion is known So in both cases the indierence between betting on Red or
on Black can be regarded as an expression of assigning equal probabilities to
both colors In the second case urn II	 however	 the probability of drawing
a red ball	 say	 is objectively given as
 

	 whereas in the rst case urn I	 the
objective probability of the same event is unknown and it is only a subjective
probability which can be asserted as being
 

 It turns out that	 although
in both cases most people are indierent when confronted with a choice of
betting on Red or on Black	 they typically prefer to have the ball drawn from
the urn II with known proportion 
 

	 regardless of whether they bet on Red
or on Black This behavior is well documented by numerous experiments It
was rst made public by Ellsberg    and has since been known as the
Ellsberg paradox It is regarded to be paradoxical because in both urns the
subjective probabilities for Black and Red are equal and therefore
 

and yet
Black I   Black II and at the same time Red I   Red II Here   means is
strictly preferred toand Black I denotes the bet on the event of a black
ball being drawn if the ball is drawn from urn I
Ellsberg also designed another experiment with only one urn but with
balls of three dierent colors	 where the nature of the paradox can be studied
more closely We shall analyze this situation in the next section
The ndings of Ellsberg have been veried in a large number of similar
betting experiments and many suggestions have been proposed for under

standing the apparent paradox One can	 of course	 simply ignore the prob

lem and discard the observed behavior as being irrational and not worth any
further study But as the observed behavior in the Ellsberg experiment is
rather persistent and therefore can hardly be dismissed on the basis of being
irrational	 an explanation for it is called for	 in particular as this kind of
behavior is probably prevalent in many practical decisions	 eg	 in economics
or in business	 see	 eg	 Sarin and Weber  
The central trait of the observed behavior seems to be that most people
shrink from uncertain events the objective probabilities of which are unknown
or only vaguely known Betting on an event with known objective probabil

ity	 like Red II	 is preferred to betting on an event with the same subjective
probability	 which however is not substantiated by an objective probability
and is therefore ambiguous	 like Red I Ambiguity is a quality attached to
probability assertions A person may assign a probability to some event	 but
may be more or less certain about the value of this probability It is ques

tionable whether a measure of ambiguity adequate for all kinds of uncertain
circumstances can be found	 but as a concept to describe situations as in
Ellsbergs experiment it is worth studying
Attempts have been made to model the behavior of the majority of people
in Ellsbergs experiment and to study the conditions under which ambiguity
is perceived by individuals in decisions under uncertainty For a recent sur

vey see Camerer and Weber  	 see also Keppe and Weber   and
Eisenberger and Weber   A famous axiomatic approach that results in
a subjective expected utility theory with probabilities replaced by capacities
has been proposed by Gilboa  	 see also Schmeidler   For a recent
further development of this approach	 where objective probabilities are in

corporated in the theory	 see Eichberger and Kelsey   For an empirical
test see Mangelsdor and Weber   Recently a dierent criterion for de

cision making in the face of uncertainty governed by interval probabilities was
proposed by Weichselberger and Augustin   Schneewei  	  
tried to explain Ellsbergs paradox by embedding Ellsbergs experiments in
a game theoretic framework
Here a dierent approach is chosen I shall argue that the typical behavior
of people in the Ellsberg experiment can be explained by assuming that
they consider subconsciously the act of drawing a ball from an urn as a
repetitive act	 despite the fact that they are told the ball will be drawn only
once In evaluating the possible gains and losses from participating in a
lottery	 people imagine the lottery to be played several times and consider
the average amount they might gain or lose For a lottery or urn with
known probabilities of gains or losses this average amount is rather certain
due to the law of large numbers But if the probabilities are unknown	 the
result of repeated lottery draws will also be unknown no matter how many
repetitions are considered When confronted with a choice between urn I
with unknown probability and urn II with known probability
 

of drawing
a red ball	 a person might assign the same subjective probability
 

to Red
for both urns as long as one draw is considered But if that person perhaps
only subconsciously imagines repeated draws from the urn she chooses and
if she is risk averse	 then she will choose urn II because it is with this urn only
that the average gain of repeated draws will be rather certain	 whereas the
uncertainty of gains from repeated draws out of urn I will remain uncertain
The paper will analyze the distribution of gains under repeated draws
in Ellsbergs experiment and will show that risk averse people will always
prefer the less ambiguous situation	 in complete accordance with the axioms
of rational choice and thus in accordance with Bayesian decision theory In
the next section the Ellsberg paradox is reviewed in a setting somewhat
dierent from what was described above Section  gives the main argument
how to evaluate the result of repeated draws and why less ambiguous events
are preferred to more ambiguous ones even if their subjective probabilities
do not dier Section  contains some concluding remarks
 The Ellsberg paradox
The Ellsberg experiment or rather one of two suggested experiments con

sists in bets on the outcome of a single draw from an urn which contains 
red balls and  black or yellow balls in an unknown proportion A person
is given a choice to bet on the outcome of the draw to be Red or to be Black
and another choice to bet on whether the outcome will be Red or Yellow or
whether it will be Black or Yellow In each case the person wins   Euro if
the color he bets upon does indeed show up otherwise nothing is gained or
lost This decision situation is depicted in the following diagram Table  	
which shows the payo function depending on the color of the ball and on the
betting act chosen When asked to choose between bets R or B	 most people
Table   Payos in Ellbergs experiment
Number of balls  
Bet on Symbol Red Black Yellow
Red R    
Black B    
Red or Yellow R  Y     
Black or Yellow B  Y     
decide for R When the same people are then asked to choose between RY
or B  Y 	 they typically decide for B  Y  Only few people would choose
R Y  Some people decide for B in the rst decision problem and for R Y
in the second problem
Let us discuss the choice of the rst group	 the majority of people The
arguments for the last group are completely analogous First one might
think that	 since nothing is known about the proportion of black and yellow
balls	 a person should assume	 owing to the principle of insucient reason	
that Black and Yellow are equally likely to show up Not that the person
thinks both colors to be in equal proportion in the urn	 he only bases his
decision on the implicit assumption that the proportion is  Perhaps a
better description of this attitude would be to say that the decision is made
as if the proportion of black and yellow balls were equal	 or more technically
the subjective probabilities of Black and Yellow are equal for this person
For	 given that nothing is known about the way the balls were put into the
urn	 why should there be a higher subjective probability for a black ball to
be drawn than for a yellow ball If someone follows this argument	 then he
will be indierent between R and B in the rst problem and between R  Y
and B  Y in the second problem In symbols R  B and R  Y  B  Y 	
because P R  P B 
 

and P R  Y   P B  Y  


	 P being a
subjective probability This	 however	 is not what is observed as the actual
behavior of most people
One can argue against this reasoning that it assumes at the outset the ex

istence of subjective probabilities This assumption is indeed what Bayesian
decision analysis is based upon There are strong arguments for making this
assumption For a recent information based argument see Ferschl  
Moreover one can prove the existence of subjective probabilities for any ra

tional decision maker from certain axioms of consistent rational choices
between acts with uncertain outcome	 Savage   These axioms do not
necessarily imply that P B  P Y  This follows only if in addition to the
axioms of rational choice the principle of insucient reason is taken as an
extra assumption But even without this additional principle	 the observed
behavior of individuals in the Ellsberg experiment stands in contrast to the
Bayesian decision rule
Suppose the decision maker	 as a Bayesian	 attaches subjective	 not neces

sarily equal	 probabilities to the events of drawing a ball with a specic color
and suppose he has a Neumann
Morgenstern utility function u	 where we
can take	 without loss of generality	 u     and u   Then the expected
subjective utilities of the four acts of the Ellsberg experiment are just the
subjective probabilities of the events betted upon Thus if R is preferred to
B R   B	 then P R  P B	 which implies P RP Y   P BP Y 	
and this again implies R  Y   B  Y  These preferences	 which follow nat

urally from a Bayesian decision framework are	 however	 contradicted by the
observed behavior of people that instead prefer B  Y to R  Y  The same
contradiction arises for those people  the minority  for which B   R and
R  Y   B  Y  only the very few with R   B and R  Y   B  Y have
preferences in accordance with Bayesian decision theory
The conclusion of the Ellsberg experiment then is that most people	 con

trary to what Bayesians say	 do not base their decision on subjective proba

bilities This is seen as a paradox Against this one may argue that it is a
paradox only to Bayesians	 that is	 only to those that believe in subjective
probabilities But the paradox goes deeper
The observed conjunction of preferences R   B and B  Y   R  Y is
paradoxical in that it violates the Sure Thing Principle	 Savage   The
preference of R to B in the rst problem should not change if one gets   Euro
not only for the color betted upon but also in case yellow turns up regardless
of whether one betted on Red or on Black Note that this   Euro is not an
additional amount that you might get in addition to the prize of   Euro for
betting on the right color You get the extra prize only if you would have lost
both of the two bets R and B	 whatever your actual bet was consult Table  
It is a kind of consolation prize that you get if neither a red nor a black ball
is drawn	 and this consolation prize should not interfere with your decision
whether to bet on Red or on Black Thus R   B should imply RY   BY 
The fact that most people	 in their behavior	 seem to contradict this almost
logical implication is seen to be paradoxical	 at least by those that see the
Sure Thing Principle as a self
evident principle of decision making Note that
this argument does not make use of any probability assertions it does not
even use the concept of probability
 Repetitive draws
The situation described in Section  changes dramatically if instead of having
just one draw from the urn several independent draws are considered After
a bet has been made	 a ball is drawn from the urn n times with replacements
Each time the color betted upon shows up	 the amount of   Euro is payed to
the decision maker Let X be the average gain 	 ie	 the amount gained after
n repeated draws divided by n Then nX  Binn P C	 where Bin stands
for the binomial distribution and P C is the probability of drawing a ball
with color C in a single draw When C is Black or Yellow	 this probability
depends	 in an obvious way	 on the proportion p of black balls within the set
of black and yellow balls	 ie	 the number of black balls divided by 
We assume that the betting acts are decided upon by a rational per

son This means that the decisions of this person are governed by a subjective
probability distribution But now the sample space consists not of the three
colors	 but rather of the various outcomes of n repeated draws A convenient
way to model probabilities for these outcomes is to assign a subjective prob

ability to the proportion p of black balls and then to compute	 in the usual
way	 conditional objective probabilities for the outcomes of n draws condi

tional on p As we are only interested in the average gain X 	 we may use the
conditional probability distribution of X given p fxjp This procedure is
based on the obvious assumption that the subjective probability of an event
coincides with its objective probability if the latter exists and is known to the
decision maker So the only truly subjective probability distribution is the
one for p Let its distribution function be denoted by F p Any rational
decision maker has a distribution F p	 which is independent of the betting
act chosen The unconditional distribution of X is then given by
fx 
Z
fxjpdF p
In particular the distribution of X for the four betting acts is given by the
following expressions for P X  x	 nx       n 
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A rational person following SEU theory bases his decisions on a Neumann

Morgenstern utility function uX	 which in our case should be increasing
That act is preferred for which the expected utility EfuXg is largest For
a risk averse person the utility function u is concave We assume	 for
simplicity	 that u is quadratic The results should	 however	 hold true also
for more general concave utility functions For a quadratic utility function	
EfuXg is a function of   EX and 

 V X If u is chosen so
that u   and u     and is taken to be increasing for x   	 then
ux  a x ax

	   a   	 and for any random variable X with range
  	 EfuXg is increasing in  and decreasing in 

 The parameters 
and 

can be easily computed for the four betting acts	 see Table  We
Table  Mean and variance of average gain X
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
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The preferences between bets are determined by the value of
EfuXg  a   a

 


where   a    and      
For n   	  is the probability of the bet to come true	 and EfuXg 
 This means that of two bets that one is preferred which has the higher
probability of coming true Therefore R   B implies RY   BY as shown
in Section  This is the betting behavior of a rational person if only one
draw is considered
Let us return to repeated draws If n becomes large then 

will be
negligible for the unambiguous bets R and BY 	 but will be large and will not
go to zero for the ambiguous bets B and RY 	 see the last column of Table 
Thus one may expect a tendency in each of the two comparisons to prefer
the unambiguous bet to the ambiguous one	 ie	 R   B and B  Y   R Y 
Of course	 whether this will	 in fact	 be true depends on the probability
distribution of p	 in particular	 on Ep and V p
To illustrate	 let us suppose that the decision maker has a symmetric dis

tribution F p	 so that Ep 
 

 For n   the expected utilities of the
four bets become as in Table 
Table  Expected utilities
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
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 



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




a


aV p
From Table  it is obvious that	 for any values of a and V p	 R   B and at
the same time B  Y   R  Y  These are exactly the preferences observed
for the majority of participants in Ellsbergs experiment They follow from
Bayesian arguments and are therefore the preferences of a rational per

son It is however a person that determines his preferences from viewing the
drawing of balls as being repeated an indenite number of times
One can generalize this result by allowing the number of red balls to
vary Let r be the ratio of red balls in the urn	 which is supposed to be
known to the decision maker In Ellsbergs original experiment r 
 

 A
simple computation	 analogous to the previous one	 leads to the expected
utilities for n of Table 	 where we assumed a symmetric distribution
for p	 as before Noting that   V p 
 

	 it is easy to see	 by letting r
Table  Expected utilities with general r
R  r  ar  r B 
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
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
V p
go to zero	 that B   R and B  Y   R  Y for suciently small r	 where
the point of switching from R   B to B   R depends on the subjectively
perceived amount of risk	 V p	 and on the measure of aversion of risk	 a
Such a switching strategy has actually been postulated by Ellsberg himself
Note that under a minimax criterion no switching of the kind described is
allowed to take place
Similar arguments lead to analogous conclusions for Ellsbergs rst exper

iment described in the Introduction Let p be the proportion of black balls
in urn I and let	 as before	 X be the average gain of n repeated indepen

dent draws from the urn chosen and for the color betted upon Then mean
and variance of X are determined as in Table 	 corresponding to Table 
For n   	 EfuXg  	 which is just the probability of winning the bet
It follows 	 for a rational person	 that R II   R I implies B I   B II 	
which	 however	 typically is not observed On the other hand	 for n large
n   and assuming Ep 
 

	 the expected utilities for R II and B II
are both
 


a

and for R I and B I they are
 


a

 aV p It follows that
a rational person will have preferences R II   R I and at the same time
B II   B I 	 which corresponds to the behavior of the majority of people in
Ellsbergs experiment
 
Table  Mean and variance of X in Ellsbergs rst experiment
betting act  

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 Conclusion
We can explain Ellsbergs paradox by assuming that people	 subconsciously
and erroneously	 evaluate the possible outcomes of the experiment as if the
draws from the urn were repeated an indierent number of times They
are assumed to have a concave possibly quadratic utility function and a
subjective probability distribution over the unknown states of the world	
which in this case are the unknown values of the proportion of balls in the
urn They then compute the subjective expected utility of the average gain
from a bet on a particular color and choose the bet with the biggest expected
utility In doing so	 they are in accordance with Bayesian SEU as well as
with the actual behavior observed in Ellsbergs experiment It turns out that
ambiguity aversion is nothing but risk aversion in a SEU framework
I must admit	 though	 that this explanation replaces one contradiction
of rational decision theory with another one In the original interpretation	
where people are supposed to fully understand the experimental set up	 which
is that indeed just one ball is to be drawn	 their behavior is in conict with
the Sure Thing Principle and so they are seen to behave irrationally In
the interpretation proposed in this paper	 their behavior is irrational in that
they misconceive the important	 albeit a bit articial	 trait of the experiment
that only one draw is to be executed In the rst interpretation people show
ambiguity aversion in the second they show risk aversion
Is there a rational explanation why people in a situation like Ellsbergs
experiment intuitively think of repeated draws even though they are told
that only one draw will be executed I should like to argue that in practical
decision situations under uncertainty the repetitive element is prevalent
Consider an entrepreneur who wants to invest in an enterprise with un

  
certain prots Suppose the entrepreneur can buy shares of a rm that for
a long time in the past showed varying yearly prots with constant mean
and variance and that will supposedly continue with that performance in the
future To be more specic	 yearly prots of that rm are iid N
 
 

 

with known 
 
and 

 
 Now suppose there is another possibility for invest

ment The entrepreneur can invest in a newly founded rm	 which will have
a rather constant	 hardly varying stream of yearly prots 	 the amount of
which however is unknown Let us	 for the sake of simplicity	 assume that  is
constant but unknown Depending on the future development of the mar

ket the rm has business in	  can turn out to be high or low	 but whatever
value it will have in the future	 this value will stay constant
If the entrepreneur is a rational decision maker in the Bayesian sense 	
he will assign a probability distribution to  Suppose   N

 


	 where
it so happens that the mean of this subjective distribution is the same as
the mean of the objective distribution in the rst case 

 
 
	 but where



 

 
 If variances were also equal the two investments would only dier
in their ambiguity	 the rst one being unambiguous	 the second one being
very ambiguous Now if the entrepreneur invested his money just to receive
a prot after one year and then went out of business	 he would prefer the
uncertain second alternative to the rst one because the second alternative
has the lower variance and both have equal means for the prot of this one
year However such a situation is rather unrealistic An entrepreneur cannot
so easily quit his engagement	 especially not in the second case If prots 
turn out to be low	 he will	 of course	 come to know this very soon	 in fact
after one year	 but so will everybody else So he will be able to disengage
from his investment only with a loss of money Therefore the entrepreneur
has to consider not just the prot of one year but rather the whole stream of
prots over the years He might wish to evaluate an average prot or rather
an average of discounted prots	 a case	 where we could argue in a similar	
but more complicated	 way and that we shall not follow up here In doing
so he will most probably prefer the rst investment even though it has the
higher variance the means being equal The reason is that for the average
prot the variance in the rst investment goes to zero if the number of years
increases but remains positive and constant for the second investment no
matter how many years the investor takes into account What looks as a
case of ambiguity aversion actually is risk aversion
As this kind of situation seems to arise quite often in practice	 we should
not be surprised to discover that people behave in Ellsbergs experiment as
if they considered not just one draw but several draws and thus come to a
conclusion which seems to contradict the axioms of rationality but is in fact
in accordance with these axioms if seen from the perspective of a long term
investment
 
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